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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






___ __ _!Z!_g_~st ~~-~wo~~ Ay_5:nu~~B!!i~ l_Ql ..... ____ _ 
Ridgewood, New Jersey 07450 
Decision appealed: March 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Davis, Cruse, Demosthenes 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-brief received August 7, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026); COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~rmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commiss· 
~ / _ Affirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Co 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
-
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Colll)sel, if any, on I /3/.W..z.O . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018} 
LB 
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Appellant challenges the March 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. The instant offense involved the appellant driving three other gang members to 
and from the robbery of a dental office, during which a dental assistant was fatally shot in the head. 
Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board’s denial was made in violation of amended 9 
NYCRR § 8002.2(a) because it failed to address its departure from the COMPAS scales; 2) the 
Board violated Appellant’s due process rights; 3) the decision to deny parole is irrational bordering 
on impropriety because the decision is conclusory and based on the instant offense while ignoring 
information supporting release; and 4) the Board effectively resentenced Appellant. These 
arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
Of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
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The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense wherein Appellant drove the car to and from a 
robbery during which a woman was shot in the head and subsequently died from her injuries; a 
final deportation order to Hong Kong; Appellant’s institutional efforts including a single 
disciplinary ticket from 2011, completion of Phase I of Transitional Services and ART, and work 
in maintenance; and release plans to live with his sister, or with his cousin if deported to Hong 
Kong. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, Appellant’s release 
package, the sentencing minutes, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and letters of 
support/assurance. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining 
release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching 
its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on instant offense. See Matter of Robinson v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New 
York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 
2017); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385, 772 N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 2004); Matter of Walker v. 
Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 
A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 
N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Marcus v. Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 476, 476, 862 N.Y.S.2d 
414, 415 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Marcelin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 308 A.D.2d 616, 
616-17, 764 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
274 A.D.2d 886, 712 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 2000), appeal dismissed, 95 N.Y.2d 958, 722 
N.Y.S.2d 474 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1026, 121 S. Ct. 1974 (2001). 
 
The decision is consistent with amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as there is no departure to 
explain. That is, the Board’s decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale within the 
assessment.   Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  The Board concluded that, despite 
low risk scores, release would be inappropriate under the three statutory standards. This is entirely 
consistent with the Board’s intention in enacting the amended regulation.  
 
The 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a forward-
looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions.  This 
proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest 
change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which 
governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 2011, the Executive Law was amended 
to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole 
release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by 
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using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 
866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 
N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; 
Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  
However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk 
and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the 
statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the 
requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of 
Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular 
result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional 
consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of 
deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes 
v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 
27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming “any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive”).  Indeed, the 
COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ 
independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should 
be released.  See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 
A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amended regulation was intended to increase 
transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board 
departs from scales in denying an inmate release.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 
2.   
 
Appellant’s due process claim is without merit. An inmate has no Constitutional right to be 
conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo 
v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 
737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more 
than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the 
due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
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The Board’s decision also satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in 
accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational “bordering on impropriety.”  
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting Matter of 
Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
